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I. INTRODUCTION
Shareholder access to a company’s proxy statement has been
1
debated for several decades. Currently, shareholders have limited
2
access to a company’s proxy statement and equally limited ability

† J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A. Augsburg
College.
1. Div. Of Corp. Fin., SEC, Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process
Regarding the Nomination and Election of Directors, (July 15, 2003), at page 12,
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf (last visited April 18, 2004)
[hereinafter July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report]. The Staff Report states that this issue
has been debated for more than sixty years. Id. For a discussion on the history of
the shareholder access debate see infra Part II.
2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 outlines the procedures for
shareholders to make proposals to be included in a company’s proxy materials. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2003).
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to nominate a candidate for a seat on the board of directors.
Director nominations typically are the responsibility of the
4
corporate board of directors.
Recently, the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) proposed
significant changes to the federal rules that would allow greater
5
shareholder access to corporate proxy statements.
Largely
supported by shareholders and shareholder activists, interest in this
rule is arguably a reaction to underperforming stocks and recent
6
corporate scandal.
In order to address what many see as a
fundamental problem with American corporate governance, the
7
The
Commission has proposed a momentous rule change.
proposed change would allow specific shareholders or groups of
shareholders, after the occurrence of certain “triggering” events, to
nominate a director candidate and have that candidate appear on
8
the company’s proxy materials.
Implementation of this rule would cause several negative
3. For a discussion on the current processes for shareholder director
nomination, see infra Part III.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (i)(8) (2003) (stating a shareholder proposal is
excluded “[i]f the proposal relates to an election for membership on the
company’s board of directors or analogous governing body”).
5. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1; Proposed Rule: Security
Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48626 (Oct. 14, 2003)
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm (last visited April
18, 2004).
6. Andrew Countryman, Most Shareholders Back Proxy Access, Study Says, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 24, 2003, at 1 (stating that in a study of more than 1000 shareholders,
80 percent favored shareholder access to the proxy for nominating board
candidates); Kathleen Day, SEC Chief Supports Plan to Aid Investors, WASH. POST, July
16, 2003, at A1 (stating that investors groups claim that corporate wrongdoing
over the previous eighteen months has “shattered” investor confidence); Deborah
Solomon, SEC Plans Comprehensive Look at Rules for Proxy Exclusions, WALL ST. J., Apr.
15, 2003, at C9 (stating “[s]hareholder activists . . . have been pushing the SEC to
consider broader investor access, especially in light of recent corporate scandals”).
7. See Andrew Countryman, SEC Moves Toward Revamp of Board Nominations,
CHI. TRIB. July 16, 2003, at 1 (noting a “historic shift” in the Commission and
stating that shareholder access has been considered for more than sixty years yet
this is the closest the Commission has ever come to altering the shareholdernomination rules); Interview by National Public Radio with Nell Minow, Editor of
the Corporate Library, All Things Considered, 2003 WL 5580470 (July 16, 2003)
(stating “[t]his is far, far greater in import than any of the post-Enron reforms, the
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, [or] the New York Stock Exchange listing standards”);
Jonathon Peterson, SEC Acts on Behalf of Investors, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at C3
(calling shareholder access a “long-cherished goal” and stating that “advocates of
corporate democracy have sought greater influence over board nominations” for
decades).
8. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 7-9.
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results in American corporations, such as further disenfranchising
investors, increasing special-interest contests, and escalating the
9
difficulty of finding qualified persons to sit on a board.
Additionally, the Commission may lack the authority to implement
10
Furthermore, sweeping
such a rule in states like Minnesota.
11
corporate governance reforms have been adopted in the last year.
These changes in corporate governance law should be allowed
sufficient time to be fully implemented and their impact assessed
12
before any additional, drastic reforms are enacted.
This comment will examine the history of the shareholder
13
Next, the comment looks at the current rules
access debate.
14
governing the nomination of directors. The comment will then
15
analyze the Commission’s July 15, 2003 proposal and October 14,
16
2003 proposed rules. The comment will also discuss the possible
negative effects of the proposed rules if put into practice and
17
consider the implications on Minnesota state law.
Finally, the
comment will analyze whether a wholesale rule change is
18
necessary and conclude that the Commission’s proposal should
19
not be implemented as a rule at this point in time.
II. HISTORY OF THE SHAREHOLDER ACCESS DEBATE
In 1942, the Commission first addressed the question of
shareholder access to the proxy for the purpose of nominating
20
director candidates.
The Commission requested that its staff
21
analyze the proxy rules and suggest changes. The staff proposed
that “minority stockholders be given an opportunity to use the
management’s proxy materials in support of their own nominees
22
for directorships.” However, the Commission did not adopt the
9. See infra Part VI.B.
10. See infra Part VI.C.
11. See infra Part VII.
12. See id.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Parts V.
17. See infra Part VI.
18. See infra Part VII.
19. See infra Part VIII.
20. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 2 (citing SEC Release no.
34-3347 (Dec. 18, 1942)).
21. Id.
22. Id. More specifically, the proposal would have allowed shareholders to
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23

1942 proposal allowing shareholder access.
Almost thirty-five years later, in 1977, the Commission again
24
addressed the issue of shareholder access.
The Commission
requested comment on whether “shareholders should have access
to management’s proxy soliciting materials for the purpose of
nominating a person of their choice to serve on the board of
25
directors.”
After public hearings were held, the Commission
proposed and adopted amendments regarding the nomination of
26
directors.
These proposed amendments, however, did not
address shareholder access to the proxy but instead addressed
27
nominating committees. The proposal required corporations to
state whether they have a nominating committee and whether that
28
committee will accept shareholder recommendations.
Once
again, the Commission did not adopt any rule allowing shareholder
29
access to company proxies.
The Commission took no further action until 1992, when once
30
The
again the Commission visited shareholder access.
Commission considered shareholder access in the context of an
31
amendment to Exchange Act Rule 14a-4. In the enactment of the
amendment, the Commission discussed the difficulty shareholders
32
experience in attempting to affect the nomination process.
Despite noting that difficulty, the Commission did not expand

promote their own nominations for director seats and nominations for company
management. Id.
23. Id. There apparently was no reason given why the shareholder access rule
was not adopted. Id. at 2, note 7.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. (citing SEC Release no. 34-13482 (April 28, 1977)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. In a 1980 staff report, the Commission stated because of the
“emerging concept of nominating committees,” the Commission felt it should not
propose and adopt a shareholder access rule at that time. Id. However, the staff
report did recommend that the Commission “monitor” the development of
nominating
committees
and
their
“consideration
of
shareholder
recommendations.” Id. The 1980 staff report advised that if the nominating
committees proved ineffective, “Commission action might be necessary.” Id. at 3-4.
30. Id. at 4 (citing SEC Release No. 34-31326 (Oct. 16, 1992)).
31. Id. (discussing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d)(4) (2002), which states “[a]
person shall not be deemed to be a bona fide nominee and he shall not be named
as such unless he has consented to being named in the proxy statement and to
serve if elected”).
32. Id.
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33

shareholder access to a company’s proxy.
Instead, the
34
Commission revised the bona fide nominee rule to allow a
shareholder to file his or her own proxy statement and proxy
35
card.
However, as discussed below, this is conducted by the
36
shareholder or shareholder group at its own expense.
Until the proposal and proposed rule that is the subject of this
comment, the Commission conducted no further public discussion
37
on shareholder access after 1992.
III. EXISTING AVENUES FOR SHAREHOLDER NOMINATION
Currently, there are three options for shareholders to
38
Shareholders may
nominate candidates for directorships.
39
nominate a candidate at a company’s annual meeting.
Shareholders may also recommend a candidate to a company’s
40
nominating committee.
Finally, under the current rules, a
41
shareholder may conduct his/her own director election.
Minnesota state law does not require that a corporation hold
42
an annual meeting.
However, the statute does carve out an
43
exception where no regular meeting has been held for a period of
33. Id. (citing SEC Release No. 34-31326 (Oct. 16, 1992)). The Commission
stated “[p]roposals to require the company to include shareholder nominees in
the company’s proxy statement would represent a substantial change in the
Commission’s proxy rules. This would essentially mandate a universal ballot
including both management nominees and independent candidate for board
seats.” Id.
34. See supra note 31.
35. See infra Part III.
36. See id.
37. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 4.
38. Id. at 5.
39. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.205 (2003) (stating the election procedures are
left to be determined by the corporate bylaws and articles of incorporation).
40. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 5.
41. Id.
42. MINN. STAT. § 302A.431, subd. 1 (2003) (“Regular meetings of
shareholders may be held on an annual or other less frequent periodic basis.”
(emphasis added)).
43. Since Minnesota law does not require an annual shareholder meeting,
the state no longer uses the term “annual meeting” and instead employs the term
“regular meeting” in reference to shareholder meetings. Id. However it should be
noted that both the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASDAQ) require that listed companies hold an annual
shareholders’ meeting in each fiscal year. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 302.00 (2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/listed/1022221393251.
html (last visited April 18, 2004); NAT’L ASS’N OF SECS. DEALERS, BY-LAWS OF THE
NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, INC. Art IV, § 4.11(a) (2003), available at http://
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44

fifteen months or greater. In such a situation, a shareholder or
shareholder group that holds more than 3% of a corporation’s
45
shares may demand a meeting of the shareholders. Regardless of
whether the corporation scheduled the meeting or its occurrence is
a result of a shareholder demand, state law dictates that director
46
elections are to take place at all regular meetings. There are no
formal state law requirements for director elections at annual
47
meetings. Provided the corporation’s articles and bylaws do not
require nominations to be submitted prior to the meeting, a
48
shareholder may simply nominate a person from the floor.
Practically speaking, many Minnesota companies include provisions
in their articles of incorporation or bylaws requiring nominations
for director seats be submitted to the corporation a specified
49
period before the meeting.
In such a situation, a shareholder
would be required to provide a corporation with notice of her
50
intent to nominate a candidate for the board at the next meeting.
Despite the relative ease of nominating a candidate for the
board at a shareholder meeting, proponents of increased
51
shareholder access contend that this option is ineffective. Since
many shareholders vote by proxy before a meeting, a candidate
cchwallstreet.com/nasd/nasdviewer.asp?SelectedNode=3&FileName=/nasd/
organization/CorporateOrganization.xml#chp_1_3_22 (last visited April 18,
2004).
44. § 302A.431, subd. 2.
45. Id. The statute defines the procedure in which a shareholder or
shareholder group may demand a regular meeting. Id. The demand for a regular
meeting must be in the form of a written notice to the corporation’s chief
executive officer or chief financial officer. Id. The corporation must respond to
the demand within thirty days of receipt. Id. In response to the demand, the
board of directors must call and schedule a regular meeting within ninety days
after receipt of the shareholder demand. Id. All expenses incurred are the
responsibility of the corporation. Id.
46. Id. at subd. 4 (“At each regular meeting of shareholders there shall be an
election of qualified successors for directors.”).
47. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.205 (2003) (stating the election procedures are
left to corporate bylaws and articles of incorporation).
48. See id.
49. 18 JOHN H. MATHESON & PHILIP S. GARON, MINN. PRAC. CORP. L. & PRAC. §
8.35 (2003). This measure is practiced by Minnesota corporations to deflect
hostile takeover attempts, and state law does not authorize nor condone this
practice. Id. However, a 1998 decision in Delaware, a state of incorporation for
many U.S. companies, ruled that a 100-day notice provision in a corporation’s
bylaws was reasonable. Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. 728
A.2d 25, 40 (Del. Ch. 1998).
50. 18 MATHESON & GARON, supra note 49, § 8.35.
51. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 5.
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nominated at a meeting is unlikely to receive the needed amount
52
Thus, it is argued that
of votes to become a board member.
shareholder nomination at an annual meeting does not provide an
53
effective means for candidate nomination to the board.
Currently, a shareholder may propose a candidate for a
directorship to a company’s nominating committee “or group of
54
directors fulfilling a similar role.” The primary function of the
nominating committee is to recommend nominees for election as
55
directors. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states that if a
company has a nominating committee, the company needs to state
in its proxy statement whether the “committee will consider
candidates recommended by security holders” and “describe the
56
procedures to be followed” in order to nominate a candidate.
Because a company is under no current obligation to disclose why a
shareholder-recommended candidate was not nominated, this
57
process has been criticized by shareholders as being ineffective.
To address the perceived ineffectiveness of shareholder
recommendations to nominating committees, the Commission
58
recently proposed additional rules. The purpose of these rules is
to enhance a corporation’s duty to disclose how shareholders may
propose candidates to a company’s nominating committee, to
disclose why a shareholder nominee may have not been accepted,

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK: Third Edition, 56 BUS. LAW. 1571, 1608
(2001) (outlining the membership, function, and criteria for a nominating
committee).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 7(d)(2) (2003).
57. Appendix A, Summary of Comments, In Response to the Commission’s
Solicitation of Public Views Regarding Possible Changes to the Proxy Rules,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47778, 30 (July 15, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/proxycomsum.pdf (last visited April 18, 2004).
58. See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and
Communications between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-48301, 68 Fed. Reg. 48, 724 (proposed Aug. 14, 2003) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48301.htm (last visited April 18, 2004). A
collateral issue to this comment, the Commission’s proposed changes are
intended to “enhance the transparency” of a corporation’s nominating committee
functions. The proposal would require companies to state in their proxy whether
they have an existing policy regarding shareholder nominations to the board. 68
Fed. Reg. at 48, 725-27. Further, a company would need to disclose in the proxy
statement the procedure used by the nominating committee in selecting a board
candidate. Id. Any rejections of shareholder-nominated candidates would require
a specific explanation from the company’s nominating committee. Id.
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and to make corporate nominating committees more “transparent”
59
to investors. This was the first time the Commission considered
increasing disclosure regarding nominating committees since
60
1978. The Commission called this “a critical step in alleviating
61
present-day corporate abuses.” While realizing the “bigger battle”
is allowing shareholder access to the proxy, the Commission
believes this increase in disclosure of nominating committee
procedures will aid investors in understanding director elections
and increase the ability for shareholders to nominate board
62
candidates. This proposal was largely adopted as a final rule on
63
November 24, 2003.
A shareholder or shareholder group may also elect to run its
64
own slate of candidates.
Under current federal rules, a
shareholder has the right to request and receive a list of the
65
security holders of a corporation. Minnesota law grants a similar
66
right. Under both state and federal law, the request must be in
writing and the security holder must defray the reasonable
67
expenses to be incurred by the corporation.
Once a list of shareholders is obtained, an individual or
shareholder group may distribute its own proxy materials, provided

59. Id. at 48, 726-27.
60. Judith Burns, SEC Gives Preliminary Approval to Rules on Board Nominations,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2003, at C9 (“SEC disclosure rules for nominating committees
haven’t been updated since 1978.”).
61. Carrie Johnson, SEC Votes to Propose Director Rules, WASH. POST, Aug. 7,
2003, at E3 (quoting SEC Commissioner Harvey J. Goldschmid).
62. See id.
63. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and
Communications between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33-8340; 34-48825 (Nov. 24, 2003) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 17 C.F.R.), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/338340.htm#P28_2205 (last visited April 18, 2004). The rule follows the proposal
briefly outlined in note 58, supra, with one exception. Fearing a quelling of
corporate board dialog, the SEC did not require companies to explain why a
shareholder-recommended candidate was not accepted.
Judith Burns,
SEC Sets New Rules on Boards, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2003, at C15 (stating the SEC
“scrapped a plan to require boards” to disclose their reasons for not accepting a
candidate recommended by shareholders).
64. See July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 4-5.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a)(2)(ii) (2003) (stating the corporation must
provide, within five business days, “a reasonably current list of the names,
addresses and security positions of the record holders”).
66. MINN. STAT. § 302A.461, subd. 4(c) (2003).
67. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.461, subd. 4, subd. 5 (2003); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a7(a)(2)(i) (2003).
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68

it complies with the Commission’s proxy rules. The shareholder
69
is responsible for printing and mailing the proxies. The cost of
70
undertaking such an endeavor can be quite high.
Regardless,
shareholders and shareholder groups have the legal right to run
their own proxy contest and nominate their candidate(s) for the
71
board.
Thus, shareholders currently have a process for the
72
nomination of board candidates.
IV. THE SEC PROPOSALS FOR SHAREHOLDER ACCESS
A. Shareholder Access to the Proxy Statement
On April 14, 2003, Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman William Donaldson stated “the time has come for a
thorough review of the proxy rules and regulations to ensure that
they are serving the best interests of today’s investors, while at the
same time, fostering sound corporate governance and transparent
73
business practices.”
The Commission announced that it had
directed the Division of Corporation Finance (the “Division”) to
74
conduct a full review of the proxy rules. Along with solicitation of
proxies for director elections, contests for corporate control, and
disclosure requirements, the Commission directed the Division to
review the current proxy rules and regulations regarding the
75
procedures for nominating and electing corporate directors. The
Commission asked the Division to consult with all interested
parties, including “representatives of pension funds, shareholder
advocacy groups, and representatives from the business and legal
76
communities.” The Commission requested the Division provide
68. See July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 5. The rules for
soliciting proxy materials and the elaborate scheme of disclosure obligations
found in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are very detailed and outside the
scope of this comment.
69. See id.
70. Lewis Braham, Bring Democracy to Boardroom Elections, BUS. WK., Oct. 21,
2002, at 126. One estimate puts the proxy cost at $2 per shareholder. Id. In a
large corporation, the cost to solicit a proxy could easily go over $1 million. Id.
71. See July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 5.
72. Id.
73. Commission to Review Current Proxy Rules and Regulations to Improve
Corporate Democracy, Press Release No. 2003-46 (Apr. 14, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-46.htm (last visited April 18, 2004).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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any recommendations for changes to the proxy rules to the
77
Commission by July 15, 2003.
On May 1, 2003, the Commission solicited public comment on
the Division’s review of the proxy rules regulating the nomination
78
and election of directors.
Of the 690 comments received, the
79
majority were made by individuals.
Accordingly, the overall
majority of comments were in support of the proposal of giving
80
shareholders access to corporate proxies to nominate directors.
Among those that opposed the proposal were corporations and
corporate executives as well as the majority of law firms and
81
individual attorneys.
On July 15, 2003, the Commission published “Staff Report:
Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and
82
Election of Directors.” The Commission listed “alternatives” to
increase shareholder involvement in the nomination and election
83
of directors. Of the alternatives discussed by the Commission, the
proposal to grant shareholders direct access to the proxy statement
84
garnered the most attention.
77. Id.
78. A full summary of the comments received by the Commission is available
at Appendix A, Summary of Comments, In Response to the Commission’s
Solicitation of Public Views Regarding Possible Changes to the Proxy Rules,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47778 (July 15, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/proxycomsum.pdf (last visited April 18, 2004).
79. Id. at 21. The categorization of the comments are as follows: 424
individuals; 165 unions, pension funds, institutional investors, and investor
associations; twenty-four social, environmental, and religious funds; eighteen law
firms and attorneys; sixteen associations; ten corporations and corporate
executives; ten shareholder resource providers; eight investment advisers and
managers; five academics; five other shareholder groups; two governmental
representatives; and three miscellaneous comments.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1.
83. Id. at 7. The SEC discusses five alternatives to accomplish increased
shareholder involvement.
Id.
Regarding shareholder nominations, the
Commission considered requiring companies to include shareholder nominees in
the proxy materials, requiring companies to deliver nominating shareholder proxy
cards with company proxy materials, and amending the Securities Exchange of
1934, Rule 14a-8 to allow for shareholder proposals regarding director
nomination.
Id.
The Commission also considered expanding disclosure
regarding nominating committees and the nomination process, including the
consideration of candidates recommended by shareholders, and also discussed
expanding shareholder access to the board as well as direct communications with
the boards of directors. Id. This comment will focus on the proposed
requirements of shareholder nominee inclusion in company proxies. Id.
84. Id.
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Simply stated, this alternative would require companies to
85
Suggested
include shareholder nominees on its proxy card.
information to be included on the proxy card would be
biographical information on the candidate and arguments for and
against each of the company’s and nominating shareholder’s
86
candidates.
The Commission noted that any and all soliciting
87
materials would continue to be filed electronically. Further, the
Commission observed, all communication would still be subject to
the bar on false and misleading statements found in Exchange Act
88
Rule 14a-9.
The Commission stated two issues that require consideration
before enacting any shareholder access rule: when shareholder
89
access may be granted and who may qualify to gain access. In
considering when a shareholder or group of shareholders shall be
given access to a proxy for the purpose of director nomination, the
Commission discussed “triggering events” that would need to occur
90
prior to the granting of shareholder access.
The Commission
acknowledged that a triggering event might add additional
91
complexity to the rule.
However, the Commission stated that
limiting the use of the shareholder access rule to these
circumstances would best serve the clear purpose of the rule: to
92
increase shareholder participation in the election of directors.
One triggering event discussed would be where a company
failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received a majority of
93
votes. A related possible triggering event is an election where a
director candidate received a significant amount of abstention or
94
“withhold” votes. In the election of directors, shareholders may
95
vote or withhold a vote for each nominee. Unlike other matters
voted on by shareholders where one may vote for, against, or
abstain, election voting is simply a vote cast for the nominee or an
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. It is also suggested by the Commission that arguments for or against
may need to be in word-limited form or outside of the proxy entirely—for
instance, on one or more designated websites.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (2003)).
89. Id. at 8.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 9.
94. Id.
95. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2).
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96

abstention.
Accordingly, director elections are generally
97
conducted under plurality voting, where the candidate with the
greatest number of votes—but not necessarily a majority—is
98
elected.
In a situation where a director candidate received a
significant amount of “withhold” votes but nonetheless still
established a plurality, the Commission suggests this to be a
99
triggering event that would invoke the shareholder access rule.
Another triggering event discussed by the Commission was the
approval of a shareholder proposal to activate the shareholder
100
access rule.
If a shareholder did not believe the proxy process
had been effective, the July 15, 2003 Staff Report suggested the
shareholder could submit a proposal via Exchange Act Rule 14a-8
requesting that the corporation comply with the shareholder access
101
procedure.
In the Staff Report, the Commission briefly discussed other
102
triggering events such as poor economic performance,
sanctioning of the corporation by the Commission, or indictments
103
of corporate officers on criminal charges.
However, the
Commission stated that any triggering event should be closely
104
linked to evidence of a failing proxy process.
Equally important to the determination of when shareholder
access should become available is the issue of who should qualify to
105
receive such access.
While the Commission recommended that
there be specific minimum standards regarding shareholders who
have access to a proxy for nomination purposes, those specific
106
standards were not defined in the July 15 proposal.
Those who
commented on the proposed rule made recommendations that
ranged from all shareholders having access to only shareholders

96. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 8.
97. However, Minnesota is unique in that it requires a majority vote in the
election of directors. See infra note 230.
98. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 12 n.25.
99. Id. at 9.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 9, note 20. The Commission stated that this type of triggering event
would require a revision of the Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 in order to enable
shareholders to obtain the capacity to submit such a proposal. A discussion of the
revision of Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 can be found infra Part IV.B.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Id. at 9, note 21.
104. Id. at 9.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 32-33.
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107

with substantial share ownership having access.
The argument
for having no share-ownership threshold put forth by many was
that large shareholders already have resources to exercise their
108
rights using existing rules.
At the same time, those with larger
ownership contended that they have a greater stake in the company
and thus have a greater interest in the use of company funds that
109
would result in the shareholder nomination process.
Throughout this debate, the ownership thresholds for shareholder
110
access most frequently discussed were 3% and 5%. Also discussed
111
was the length of time a shareholder has owned voting stock.
Length of ownership suggestions ranged from one year to at least
112
three years. As stated above, the Commission declared that some
113
sort of criteria will need to be implemented.
Two other alternatives were discussed in the Staff Report that,
while somewhat outside the scope of this comment, merit some
114
discussion.
B. Two Alternatives to Shareholder Access
The Commission discussed two alternatives to shareholder
access. The first alternative is similar to a requirement that
companies include shareholder nominees in company proxy
115
The Commission discussed delivering separate,
materials.
nominating shareholders’ proxy cards along with company proxy

107. Id. at 9-10
108. Id. at 10. Current nomination processes available to shareholders were
discussed supra Part III. One such process is a shareholder-conducted election.
This can be an expensive endeavor. Thus the minority shareholders argue that
large shareholder or shareholder groups have the resources to conduct such an
election and therefore are not the group that needs increased access to the proxy.
109. Id. Companies would be required to fund the listing of shareholder
nominees on the proxy materials. Since this cost will impact the company and
thus the largest shareholders, that group feels they should have the greatest
control over exactly who is placed on the proxy ballot.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 9. In the proposed rule the Commission narrowed this criteria by
stating that only shareholders or shareholder groups owning at least 5% of
company’s shares, for at least two years prior to the triggering event, can nominate
a candidate for the next director election. For a discussion on the proposed rule,
see infra Part V.
114. Id. at 16, 28.
115. Id. at 16.
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116

materials.
The American Bar Association’s Task Force on
Shareholder Proposals proposed this variation on shareholder
117
access.
This differs from the alternative outlined above where a
company would be required to include a shareholder nominee on
118
This alternative would require a
the company’s proxy material.
company to include a separate nominating shareholder’s proxy
119
card together with the company’s own proxy card.
This
120
occurrence could also be subject to a triggering event. Directives
for the rule include a requirement for a company “to note briefly
in its proxy materials that a shareholder or shareholder group had
nominated a candidate to board of directors, that the shareholder’s
proxy card is included in the company’s mailing, and that
121
additional disclosure . . . may be found on a specified website.”
While unlike the alternative discussed above where the
shareholder nominees would actually appear on the company’s

116. Id.
117. Comments of Task Force on Shareholder Proposals, Section of Business
Law
of
the
American
Bar
Association
(June
13,
2003),
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/aba061303.htm (last visited April 18,
2004) [hereinafter ABA Comment]. The thirty-one-page comment written by the
Task Force in response to the Commission’s May 1, 2003, solicitation for comment
is mainly analytical in nature. The Task Force states that due to the early
procedural stage of the Commission’s examination of shareholder access, no
specific recommendations were given. Instead, the ABA outlines what it believes
to be fundamental policy issues, such as the need for a new director selection
system, eligibility requirements, and viewpoints for and against the expansion of
shareholder access. The Task Force goes on to discuss some alternatives to the
shareholder access proposals. Along with allowing shareholders to utilize the
company’s proxy mailings to solicit their own candidates, the Task Force also looks
at a revision of Exchange Act Rule 14a-8. Finally, the Task Force examines the
Commission’s authority to expand shareholder access.
118. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 16.
119. Id.
120. Id. The SEC did not outline any specific triggering events that would
require a company to include a nominating shareholder’s proxy card along with
the company’s proxy. Id. It is assumed that the SEC would subject such a rule to
the same triggering events outlined supra Part IV.A.
121. Id. The SEC notes that any disclosure regarding the nomination of
shareholder candidates, including campaigning for shareholder nominees, would
appear on a nominating shareholders’ website. Additionally, all disclosures
related to nominating shareholders would be filed electronically with the
Commission. Id. The Commission also states that a rule similarly could require
that the company’s soliciting materials be listed on the company’s website. Id.
Regardless of where the information is listed and who lists it, the Commission
states that all communications related to shareholder nominees would be subject
to the prohibition against false and misleading statements as prescribed by
Exchange Act Rule 14a-9. Id.
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proxy materials, the company would still be required to absorb the
122
cost of mailing the nominating shareholder’s proxy card.
Additionally, a current rule requires that any solicitation delivered
to a shareholder be preceded by or concurrent with the delivery of
123
a definitive proxy statement.
This alternative could cause a
shareholder to receive a nominating shareholder’s proxy card
without first, or at least concurrently, receiving a proxy statement
124
disclosure about the shareholder nominee.
Thus, if
implemented, this alternative would need to provide shareholders
with the required disclosure, enabling an informed decision when
125
casting a vote for a shareholder candidate or a board candidate.
As discussed above, the Commission suggests a designated website
where relevant information could be found regarding the
126
nominees.
An additional alternative discussed by the Commission was the
127
revision of Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(8).
This rule
currently allows companies to exclude a shareholder proposal that
“relates to an election for membership on the company’s board of
128
directors or analogous governing body.”
The Commission has
ruled that a company may exclude a shareholder proposal if such a
129
proposal may result in an election contest.
The Commission in the Staff Report of July 15, 2003 discussed
130
the alternatives to this rule. The Commission stated two possible
options: establish a new analysis of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) or amend the

122. Id. The Commission notes that currently under Exchange Act Rule 14a-7,
a company may choose to mail a shareholder’s proxy materials instead of
providing the nominating shareholder with a mailing list of current shareholders.
Id. at 16, n.27. However, this mailing is by choice and has two major distinctions
over the current proposal. Id. First, the shareholder’s proxy materials would be
mailed separately from the company’s proxy. Id. Second, the cost of the mailing
would be charged to the shareholder and not absorbed by the company. Id.
123. Id. at 17 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(f) (2002)). This rule states “[n]o
person conducting a solicitation subject to this regulation shall deliver a form of
proxy, consent or authorization to any security holder unless the security holder
concurrently receives, or has previously received, a definitive proxy statement that
has been filed with the Commission pursuant to § 240.14a-6(b).” 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-4(f) (2002)).
124. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 17.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 28.
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8).
129. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 28.
130. Id.
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131

rule to allow shareholders to access a company’s proxy.
The
Commission suggests that under either an amendment or a change
132
in analysis to the rule, state law would be implicated.
State law
133
requires shareholder proposals to be voted on by the board.
Thus, a change to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) would need to provide an
exemption for any proposal, such as a shareholder nomination,
134
that would violate state law. The Commission notes that the rule
could still be utilized to exclude certain proposals, “such as those
that nominate a particular person to the board,” or “proposals that
seek to remove current directors from the board,” as well as
135
proposals to attempt to affect the outcome of a director election.
V. THE PROPOSED RULE
On October 14, 2003 the Commission issued a proposed set of
136
rules that put the proposal outlined above into a rule format.
Over more than sixty years of debate, this is the first time the
concept of allowing shareholder nomination has made it to the
137
proposed rule stage.
While the Commission originally had
planned on implementation of the rule by the 2004 proxy season,
the SEC recently held a roundtable discussion to further discuss the
proposed rule and appears to be taking no action regarding the
138
rule until at least early spring 2004.
The October 14, 2003 proposed rule is more than 100 pages
long, contains more than 200 footnotes, and puts forward more
139
than 300 separate questions posed to the potential commenter.
However, the proposed rule does not appear to stray far from the
140
July 15, 2003 proposal discussed at length above.
One of two
triggering events, discussed in the July 15 proposal and fine-tuned
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Id. For a discussion on state law, see infra Part VI.C.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-48626 (Oct. 14, 2003) available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/34-48626.htm (last visited April 18, 2004) [hereinafter October 14, 2003
Proposed Rule].
137. See supra Part II.
138. Notice of Roundtable Discussion Regarding Proposed Rules Relating to
Security Holder Director Nominations, Feb. 9, 2004, at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2004-15.htm (last visited April 18, 2004).
139. October 14, 2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 136.
140. See id.
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in the October 14 proposed rule, must occur before shareholders
141
The first
will have the option to nominate a director candidate.
triggering event outlined by the Commission is if at least 35% of
142
the shares voted are withheld from a particular board nominee.
That is, if at least one of the board’s candidates receives “withhold
votes” from 35% or more of the voting shares at an annual
meeting, shareholder nomination would be considered
143
“triggered.” Alternatively, under the proposed rule, shareholders
may also trigger the right to nominate a candidate if a 1%
shareholder, or a group constituting 1% of share ownership that
has owned shares of the company’s stock for at least one year,
144
proposes the right to nominate a director candidate.
Once that
event occurs, a majority of voting shareholders must approve the
145
proposal to nominate.
The Commission also put forth a third triggering event to
solicit public comment: failure by a company to act on a
146
shareholder proposal that receives a majority vote.
The
Commission devoted far less discussion to this possible third
147
triggering event.
The Commission expressed concern over
whether or not “the link between the possible ineffectiveness of, or
dissatisfaction with, a company’s proxy process and this possible
nomination procedure triggering event is more indirect than in the
case of the two nominating process triggering events proposed
148
[above].”
The Commission expressed further concern over the
intricacies of the rule, relating to the determination of whether a
shareholder proposal was actually implemented, potentially causing
149
time-consuming disputes.
After leaving the issue somewhat unsettled in the July 15
proposal discussed above, the Commission discussed exactly who
150
could nominate a director.
Once one of the triggering events
141. Id. at Part II.A.3.a.
142. Id.
143. Id. The reality of a 35% withhold vote was recently evidenced by the 43%
withhold vote for Walt Disney CEO and ex-Chairman Michael Eisner. Dennis K.
Berman & Debra Solomon, Death by Proxy? Vote on Eisner Causes Stir, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 4, 2004 at C5.
144. October 14, 2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 136, at Part II.A.3.a.
145. Id.
146. Id. at Part II.A.3.b.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at Part II.A.5.a.
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outlined above occurs, any shareholder or group of shareholders
holding at least 5% of a company’s shares for at least two years
prior to the triggering event, can propose a candidate for the next
151
director election.
If more than one shareholder or group of
shareholders propose candidates, the candidate for largest holder
152
or group will be nominated.
Once the shareholder access rule has been triggered, the
Commission also proposed a limitation on how many shareholder
153
nominees would be permitted.
For a company that has a board
composed of eight or fewer directors, the proposed rule calls for
154
Under
one shareholder nominee to be included on the proxy.
the proposed rule, a company that has more than eight but fewer
than twenty directors would be required to include two shareholder
155
nominees.
If the board consists of twenty or more members,
156
three nominees would be required. To put the above quotas into
perspective, the vast majority of public companies’ boards are made
up of fewer than twenty directors, with an overall median board
157
size of nine.
Comments for the October 14, 2003 proposed rule were due
158
The response was extraordinary. In the
by December 22, 2003.
history of the Securities and Exchange Commission, no proposed
159
rule has generated more comment letters.
The Commission
received a record 12,000-plus comment letters regarding the
160
proposed rule. It should be noted, however, that almost 9500 of
those comment letters were form letters generated by large,
161
unidentified lobby organizations in favor of the proposed rule.
151. Id. Thus any actual shareholder nomination would take place the year
following the triggering event.
152. Id.
153. Id. at Part II.A.7.a.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at note 114 (stating that in a sample 1439 public companies,
approximately 42% of the surveyed companies had eight or fewer directors and
approximately 58% were composed of nine to nineteen directors).
158. October 14, 2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 136.
159. Adrian Michaels, SEC Move to Boost Power of Shareholders Wins Support, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003 at 1 (stating the Commission “received a record number of
comments”).
160. Id. (stating that previously the Commission had received 7000 comment
letters on a proposal that would force institutional investors to disclose their voting
records).
161. Id.
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162

At the time of this writing, the Commission had yet to make
any final decisions regarding the proposed rule, and the SEC’s five
163
commissioners appear to be “divided on the issue.”
On March
10, 2004, the Commission held a roundtable discussion on the
proposed shareholder nomination rule. The daylong discussion
includes a comment period extending through the end of March
164
2004.
Accordingly, it appears the Commission will not be acting
165
on the proposed rule until April 2004 at the earliest.
VI. ANALYSIS
A. The Misnomer of Corporate Democracy
Those who submitted comments in favor of increased
shareholder access to the proxy often use the concept of “corporate
166
democracy” as their rally cry. In a country where the principle of
democracy is held in the highest esteem, it is easy to understand
why many believe democracy should extend to the selection of
167
those who inhabit the boardroom. Yet a strong argument can be
made that this is a misplaced analogy and the common notion of
democracy is not synonymous with the idea of “corporate

162. March 11, 2004.
163. Joshua Chafin & Adrian Michaels, Proposals on Proxies Spark Disagreement,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at 17.
164. See supra note 138.
165. See Andrew Countryman, Vote on Shareholder Nominations Weeks Away,
Regulators Say, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2004, at A3, available at 2004 WL 6924830
(stating that due to the complexity of the rule, it may be “several weeks” before the
SEC takes any action).
166. See Comments of Institutional Shareholder Services (June 13, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/iss061303.htm (last visited April 18,
2004) (stating “[a]ny democracy is only as robust as its electoral process” and
“[e]lections at U.S. corporations lack several attributes of any good democratic
system”); Comments of State of Wisconsin Investment Board (June 12, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/swib061203.htm (last visited April 18,
2004) (suggesting the Commission takes steps toward more competitive board
elections in the name of corporate democracy); Comments of Trillium Asset
Management Corporation (June 12, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/
s71003/trilliumamc061203.htm (last visited April 18, 2004) (stating it is time for
the Commission to make changes so that corporate democracy will no longer be
an “oxymoron”); Comments of Council of Institutional Investors (May 10, 2003),
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/cii051003.htm (last visited April 18,
2004) (likening corporate board members to elected government officials who
thus are subject to the rules of democracy).
167. See supra note 166.
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168

democracy.”
Foremost among the differences between government
elections and corporate board of director elections is the issue of
169
duty.
In an election for a board seat, the board has a fiduciary
duty to nominate candidates that will act in the best interest of the
170
corporation.
Distinguish that duty from an election for a
government official, where the voter may vote with her sole
171
The fiduciary duty of board members, to
interests in mind.
nominate director candidates that benefit the entire corporation
and not just the interests of one shareholder or shareholder group,
172
is of utmost importance to corporate survival. Since shareholders
have no duty to the corporation, if the shareholder nomination
proposal becomes a rule, a shareholder would be free to nominate
173
whomever she desires.
Without the legal responsibility charged
to directors by law in the nominations of director candidates,
shareholders could nominate candidates with their sole interests in
mind, without any recourse or accountability to the corporation or
174
the body of shareholders.
Another difference to note when distinguishing corporate
democracy from political democracy is the ability of a shareholder
175
to take the “Wall Street Walk.”
There is no requirement for
176
Unlike a voter in a governmental
anyone to be a shareholder.
election, if a shareholder is unhappy with a company for any
reason, she may sell her stock and cease contact with that
177
corporation.
It is important to remember that a corporation is
168. ABA Comment, supra note 117 (stating that a corporation is not a
political entity).
169. Comments of American Society of Corporate Secretaries (June 13, 2003),
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/ascs061303.htm (last visited April 18,
2004) (stating the most fundamental difference between corporate and
governmental elections is the duty that the two different electorates owe).
170. Ray v. Homewood Hosp., 223 Minn. 440, 444, 27 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1947)
(“Directors may not agree to exercise their official duties for the benefit of any
other individual or interest other than the corporation itself . . .”).
171. Comments of American Society of Corporate Secretaries (June 13, 2003),
supra note 169.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. Constance A. Bagley & Karen L. Page, The Devil Made Me Do It: Replacing
Corporate Directors’ Veil of Secrecy with the Mantle of Stewardship, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
897, 909 (1999) (defining the “Wall Street Walk” as the ability of a shareholder to
sell her stock in a company in which she is dissatisfied).
176. ABA Comment, supra note 117.
177. Bagley & Page, supra note 175, at 909.
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an “economic entity whose function is to create wealth for its
178
A corporation is not a political body in which the lack
owners.”
of voting power to nominate a candidate would create
179
oppression. In the case of the nomination of a board candidate,
180
if a shareholder is not happy, she may simply sell her shares.
A fundamental piece of the discussion of corporate democracy
is the debate over who actually “owns” a corporation. The
commonly accepted answer to that question is that the
181
shareholders are the rightful owners. Those who commented on
the proposal discuss ownership of a corporation as being akin to
182
owning actual property. Along with this notion is the idea that a
property owner may do whatever she wants with her property,
183
provided she does not harm any third parties.
The argument
follows that a corporation must do whatever its owners, the
184
shareholders, wish.
Yet, what do shareholders actually own? A
share of stock is a financial interest in a corporation, not ownership
185
There are other parties
of a corporation’s assets or property.
involved—employees, customers, creditors, and communities—that
186
all have a strong interest in the corporation’s survival.
Shareholder interest lies in financial gain and thus may or may not
187
have concern for the corporation’s long-term success. While the
common belief may be that the shareholders “own” the
corporation, it is very important to realize that there are other
188
interests at stake along with the shareholders’ financial interest.
Granting a significant amount of control to shareholders under the

178. ABA Comment, supra note 117.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248 (1999) (stating that many “legal scholars” feel that
shareholders are the owners of a corporation).
182. Comments of the Council of Institutional Investors (May 10, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/cii051003.htm (last visited April 18,
2004) (stating that “wealth is maximized when owners . . . care for their own
property” and thus shareholders should be able to control what they own).
183. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenbaum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 191 (1991).
184. Id. at 191-92.
185. Id. at 193-94.
186. Id. at 192.
187. For a discussion of the fiduciary duty of a director, see supra Part VI.A.
188. Bill George, Why It’s Hard to Do What’s Right . . . , FORTUNE, Sept. 29, 2003,
at 95 (placing shareholder concerns after the concerns of employees and
customers).
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notion that they are “owners” may place the focus upon short-term
financial gain at the risk of the long-term growth and sustainability
189
of a corporation.
There is a tremendous amount of misplaced emotion behind
190
the concept of corporate democracy. One commenter even went
so far as to liken current director elections to elections “held today
in North Korea, Iraq, Cuba and many other countries where a
191
dictatorship style of government still exists.”
This notion is
greatly misguided. Analysis of the proposal shows that it is not the
small, private investor who will be given a voice by this proposed
192
rule. Instead, it is a few large shareholders or shareholder groups
193
who will receive these rights.
It is also significant to remember
that most of the individually held stock in this country is owned by
194
While the goal of the proposal is to
the wealthiest citizens.
increase “shareholder participation in the process related to
195
elections” and thus improve corporate governance, the proposal
actually could further disenfranchise a large number of smaller,
196
non-institutional shareholders. By granting these special rights to
large shareholders who, unlike directors, have no duty to act in the
best interest of all shareholders, the proposal actually brings
corporate America farther from the goal of corporate democracy.

189. Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 147, 177 (2001) (stating “[t]he danger is that too much deference to
stockholder interest may get in the way of transactions that otherwise make sense
and should go forward.”).
190. Comments of American Society of Corporate Secretaries (June 13, 2003),
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/ascs061303.htm (last visited April 18,
2004) (urging the Commission to be “cautious of the emotionally charged nature”
of the term “corporate democracy”).
191. Comments
of
Gary
L.
Nystrom
(May
30,
2003),
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/glnystrom053003.htm (last visited April
18, 2004).
192. October 14, 2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 136, at Part II.A.5.a (stating
the right to nominate would be given to shareholders holding more than 5% of
the shares of a company).
193. See id.
194. Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283,
310 n.115 (1998) (stating the wealthiest 10% in the United States own almost 90%
of all stock).
195. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 2.
196. This begs the question: If the proposal only grants the power to nominate
to shareholders of 5%, what about the other 95%?
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B. Policy Issues
One of the biggest concerns related to the enactment of a
shareholder access rule is the threat that special interest groups
197
might attain a position on the board. A group of shareholders or
even a single shareholder that owns 5% of a company’s shares
198
It is possible that
would have the power to nominate a director.
this proposal, through a nominating shareholder wanting to gain a
voice on the board to advance his concern, could give additional
199
power to special interest groups. For example, if a group wanted
to advance its agenda, it may attempt to nominate a candidate who
would represent its cause in the boardroom rather than the
200
broader interest of the corporation.
If elected, that candidate
201
would have what many see as a conflict of interest. Directors have
a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the corporation as a
202
However, since a director candidate needs at least a
whole.
plurality vote to be elected, even a special-interest director would
join the board only if she received approval from a large group of
203
shareholders.
In reality, the argument of a special interest
candidate being elected and carrying that agenda into the
boardroom may not be that large of a threat. Nevertheless, the
threat of special interest directors leads to another policy concern
regarding shareholder access.
While the fact that a director needs a plurality vote to be
197. See Comments of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (June
13, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/tfpcprabny061303.htm#
P39_25962 (last visited April 18, 2004) (stating the adoption of the proposal would
“facilitate the election of ‘special interest’ directors”); Comments of the
Committee of Securities Regulation of the Business Law Section of the New York
State Bar Association (June 13, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/
scrblsnysba061303.htm (last visited April 18, 2004) (claiming the proposal could
“lead to directors representing special interest which would run counter to the
initiatives for independent boards”); Comments of Harvard University (June 6,
2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/harvard060603.htm (last
visited April 18, 2004) (warning that mechanisms should be put in place that
prohibit the election of any special interest directors).
198. October 14, 2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 136.
199. See supra note 197.
200. Id.
201. Comments of Harvard University (June 6, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/other/s71003/harvard060603.htm (last visited April 18, 2004).
202. For a discussion of the fiduciary duty of a director, see supra Part VI.A.
203. Comments of Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk (June 13, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/labebchuk061303.htm (last visited April
18, 2004).
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elected may quell the special interest argument, the threat of a
special interest causing coercion by threatening a director
204
nomination is real.
In order to advance an agenda, a 5%
shareholder may threaten to nominate a candidate to the board
205
True, the candidate would still
who carries that special interest.
need to obtain at least a plurality vote, depending on the state,
206
before being elected.
Nonetheless, under the proposal a
corporation would be forced to absorb the cost of including the
207
candidate’s name on the proxy.
While this threat is presently
available to shareholders interested in nominating a candidate, the
key difference is that currently the corporation does not fund a
208
proxy contest lodged by a shareholder.
If the proposal is passed
into law, it could force corporations to engage in and fund proxy
209
contests each year. Ironically, since a company may now need to
fund the contest, this could shift the cost of a shareholder proxy
contest from a few shareholders that lodge the contest to all
210
shareholders. Conceivably, in order to avoid this cost burden, a
corporation’s board of directors may give greater weight to a
211
special interest proposal.
This may or may not be in the best
212
interest of the corporation as a whole.
Another concern among opponents of the proposed rule is
the increasing difficulty in finding qualified persons to sit on a
213
corporate board. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes) and recent
204. Comments of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz (June 11, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/wachtell061103.htm (last visited April
18, 2004) (stating that, even under the current rules, the “mere threat of a proxy
contest” can force a board to act).
205. See supra note 197.
206. A plurality vote is needed for director elections in most states. However,
Minnesota law requires a majority. MINN. STAT. § 302A.437 (2003) (stating any
action by the shareholders requires a majority vote).
207. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 9.
208. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.461, subd. 4, subd. 5 (2003); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a7(a)(2)(i) (2003).
209. Comments of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz (June 11, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/wachtell061103.htm (last visited April
18, 2004) (stating that proxy contests can be very “disruptive” to a corporation).
210. Comments of the Committee of Securities Regulation of the Business Law
Section of the New York State Bar Association (June 13, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/scrblsnysba061303.htm (last visited April
18, 2004).
211. Id.
212. Directors are under a duty to act in the best interest of the corporation.
See supra Part VI.A.
213. See Comments of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (June
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corporate scandal has subjected directors to a significant increase
214
Finding qualified candidates to fill board
in public scrutiny.
positions that satisfy the increased requirements under Sarbanes is
215
becoming difficult.
It can now take twice as long to find a
216
It is estimated that
qualified candidate as it did a decade ago.
90% of qualified board candidates already turn down director
217
positions for fear of being sued.
A qualified director candidate
may be less likely to agree to board service given the greater
possibility of a proxy contest creating contentious elections and
218
“risk to reputation in the event of a loss.”
Again, by not having
the most qualified people on the board, this may sacrifice the best
219
interest of the corporation to satisfy the interest of a few.
Finally, it is important to remember the corporate scandals
that the shareholder access proposal addressed were the improper
220
actions of only a few companies, namely Enron and WorldCom.
However, the shareholder access proposal will affect all public
221
Thus hundreds, perhaps
companies, for better or worse.
222
thousands,
of public companies across the nation that are
currently conducting business ethically and responsibly will be
223
punished for the acts of a few.
13,
2003),
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/tfpcprabny061303.
htm#P39_25962 (last visited April 18, 2004).
214. Id. For a discussion on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see infra Part VII.
215. Kemba J. Dunham, Reforms Turn Search for Directors Into a Long, Tedious
Task, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at B1 (citing increased restrictions on
independence, criminal liability, and disclosure as having contributed to the
difficult task of attracting qualified board candidates).
216. Lisa Holton, Help Wanted: Filling Vacancies on Corporate Boards Creates
Headaches for In-House Lawyers, 90 A.B.A. J. 30, 30 (2004) (stating that for small and
midsized companies, recent corporate scandal and new governance rules that
require increased independence have resulted in twice the director search time
than that of ten years ago).
217. Dunham, supra note 215 at B1.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Tom Walsh, The 2003 Herald Hundred; Bears Settled in, at Home in 2002,
BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 24, 2003, at 4 (naming Enron including Arthur Anderson,
WorldCom, and Tyco as being major players in the corporate scandals of 2002).
221. Many, if not most, of the companies that would be affected are listed on
the New York Stock Exchange. Thus, to get an idea of the number of companies
that may be impacted, one can look at the more than 2800 companies listed on
the NYSE. New York Stock Exchange website, at http://www.nyse.com/listed/
p1020656067970.html?displayPage=%2Flisted%2F1020656067970.html
(last
visited April 18, 2004).
222. Id.
223. Comments of Securities and Exchange Commissioner Cynthia A.
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C. The SEC versus the State
Any rule regarding shareholder rights traditionally has been
224
The United
left up to the state of incorporation to determine.
States Supreme Court has weighed in on this topic, stating
“[c]orporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit
their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that,
except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of
directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the
225
internal affairs of the corporation.”
Under Minnesota law, it is
the board of directors, and not the shareholders, that manage the
226
business of the corporation.
Foremost in this analysis is the fact
that Minnesota law allows any requirements regarding director
227
elections to be determined by the corporation.
While not
specifically addressed, the nomination of director candidates is
228
certainly a requirement regarding the election of directors.
Thus, under Minnesota law, this leaves the nomination of directors
229
up to the corporation.
Minnesota corporate law is unique in that it requires a majority
230
vote for any director election.
This invalidates one of the
Glassman, Securities and Exchange Commission Open Meeting (Oct. 8, 2003), at
23:35, at http://www.sec.gov/news/openmeetings.shtml (last visited April 18,
2004) [hereinafter SEC Open Meeting] (stating the best way to implement this
proposal would be to “ferret out the complacent boards . . . and leave the effective
boards alone.”).
224. Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union of Am., Minn. Div. v. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am., 207 Minn. 80, 85, 289 N.W. 884, 886 (1940) (quoting 1
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 194, Cmt. a, “[t]he existence and extent of the
right of shareholders to control the actions of corporate officers or agents is
determined by the law of the state of incorporation”).
225. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (quoting Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975), emphasis in original); see Robert B. Thompson,
Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote,
Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 222 (1999) (discussing federal law’s
“respect” for state corporate law).
226. MINN. STAT. § 302A.201 subd. 1 (2003) (stating that the “business and
affairs of a corporation shall by managed by or under the direction of a board”).
227. MINN. STAT. § 302A.205 (2003) (stating that under state law the only
requirement is that directors be natural persons. “The method of election and
any additional qualifications for directors may be imposed by or in the manner
provided in the articles or bylaws.”).
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. MINN. STAT. § 302A.437 (2003) (stating any action by the shareholders
requires a majority vote). The majority of states include a provision in their state
corporate laws that allow for plurality voting in director elections. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 10-728 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-712 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
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Commission’s chief triggering events for the proposal—a
231
substantial withhold vote. In Minnesota, a nominee for the board
can be elected only after receiving a majority vote from the
232
shareholders.
Therefore, the concern expressed by the
Commission, that a director may be elected without a majority vote,
233
is not a reality in Minnesota.
A rule that allows shareholders direct access to a proxy
statement for nomination purposes arguably could violate state law
234
because state law grants nominations to the board.
It has been
argued that the core responsibility of the Commission is to regulate
corporate disclosure rather than address substantive corporate law,
235
which typically is a state law function.
Indeed, the Commission
607.0728 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-728 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414149 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-728 (2003); IND. CODE § 23-1-30-9 (2003); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 271B.7-280 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 730 (2003); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 79-4-7.28 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-531 (2003); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2066 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:7.28 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. §
60.251 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-280 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-17-209
(2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 7.28 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-669 (2003);
W.VA. CODE § 31D-7-728 (2003); WIS. STAT. § 180.0728 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
17-16-728 (2002) (all stating “[u]nless otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation, directors are elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares
entitled to vote in the election at a meeting”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 subd. 3
(2003) (stating “[d]irectors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares
present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 176506 (2002) (stating “directors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes of the
stockholders present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and
entitled to vote on the election of directors.”); MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2404 (2003) (stating “[u]nless the charter or bylaws of a corporation provide
otherwise, a plurality of all the votes cast at a meeting at which a quorum is present
is sufficient to elect a director”); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 450.1441 (2003) (providing a
carve-out for director elections, stating a majority vote is required for all
shareholder acts except a director election, where a plurality is needed to elect a
director); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.265 (2003) (stating all shareholders actions must
be approved by a majority vote except for director elections where a plurality vote
is needed); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-11 (2003) (stating “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by the certificate of incorporation, directors shall be elected by a
plurality of the votes cast at an election.”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 614 (2003)
(stating “[d]irectors shall, except as otherwise required by this chapter or by the
certificate of incorporation as permitted by this chapter, be elected by a plurality
of the votes cast at a meeting of shareholders”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18 § 1061 (2002)
(stating directors must be elected by a plurality of the vote); TEX BUS. ORG. CODE
ANN. § 21.359 (2003) (allowing the articles of incorporation to alter the state
plurality vote rule for director elections).
231. October 14, 2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 136, at Part II.A.3.a.
232. MINN. STAT. § 302A.437 (2003).
233. See id.
234. Id.
235. Bus. Roundtable v. S.E.C., 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C.Cir. 1990)(stating that
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itself states that the federal securities laws “derive from a simple
and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large
institutions or private individuals, should have access to certain
236
basic facts about an investment prior to buying it.” In order to
accomplish this, the Commission requires “public companies to
disclose meaningful financial and other information to the
237
public.” A District of Columbia circuit court ruled in 1990 that a
Commission rule regulating a substantive corporate governance
238
issue was “far beyond the matters of disclosure.”
A shareholder
access rule can be characterized as a necessary and primary task of
the board of directors that “is concededly a part of corporate
239
governance traditionally left to the states.”
Accordingly, a rule
granting shareholder access is outside of the authority of the
240
If the proposed
Commission and is better served by state law.
rule passes, it will surely be challenged as preempting state law,
241
historically the domain of corporate law. One group already has
242
Should the rule be adopted, the U.S.
threatened such a suit.
Chamber of Commerce, a not-for-profit business federation, has
243
stated it will explore taking the Commission to court. As outlined
in the argument above, the trade group’s position is that the
Commission lacks the authority to regulate the nomination and
election of board candidates and that such authority should be left
244
to the individual states.
VII. RECOMMENDATION—ALLOW TIME FOR RECENT REGULATIONS
Reacting to a year of major corporate scandal, in 2002
“the Exchange Act cannot be understood to include regulation of an issue that is
so far beyond matters of disclosure”).
236. Introduction—The SEC: Who We Are, What We Do, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission website, at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
(last visited April 18, 2004).
237. Id.
238. Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 408.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 411 (quoting a 1934 Senate Report, stating that when enacting the
Exchange Act of 1934, Congress did not intend for the Commission to have the
authority or “power to interfere in the management of corporations”).
241. Comments of Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, SEC Open Meeting, supra
note 223, at 48:48 (questioning whether the SEC has the ability to impose
substantive rules outside of disclosure provisions).
242. Phil McCarty, SEC’s Proxy Plan Threatened with Suit by Business Chamber,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2004, at A6.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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245

Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“Sarbanes”). Sarbanes
246
has caused major changes in corporate governance law.
Addressing what it believed to be defective corporate governance
laws, Congress enacted a number of provisions that dictate how a
247
corporation should be managed. Specific attention was paid to a
248
corporation’s audit committee.
These corporate governance
reforms were focused on audit committees to strengthen the
249
An audit
committee’s role as a “watchdog” of the corporation.
committee is responsible for the supervision of all outside
250
accounting and auditing. Sarbanes requires that the entire audit
committee be independent and that no audit committee director
251
can be “an affiliated person of the issuer.”
This means that an
audit committee member cannot be an executive officer or
employee of the company, or hold more than 10% stock in the
252
company.
Congress enacted this provision in an attempt to
253
remedy recent “financial scandals.” This goal is exactly the same
as one of the goals the shareholder nomination proposal is
254
attempting to achieve.
Sarbanes has been called “the most sweeping corporate
255
regulatory statute since the Great Depression.” While that fact is
important, it is even more crucial to realize that Sarbanes is still
256
being implemented.
Many of these regulations have not yet
245. Niels Schaumann, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Bird’s-Eye View, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1317 (2004). Sarbanes is a large and comprehensive Act that, in
summary, involves the regulation of accounting practices, audit committees,
director independence, professional conduct for lawyers, financial statement
certification, disclosure requirements, and corporate management. Id.
246. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1142 (2003) (stating that
Sarbanes “straightforwardly works significant changes in corporate governance of
public corporations”).
247. Schaumann, supra note 245, at 1317.
248. Id. at 1340.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Sta. 745, 775776 (2002) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (amending the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A(m)(1)(A)).
252. Schaumann, supra note 245, at 1342 n.148.
253. Id. at 1322.
254. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 5 (stating a majority of
comments on the proposal expressed concern over recent corporate scandals).
255. Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political Economy of Issuer
Choice in International Securities Regulation, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1363, 1433 n.8 (2002).
256. Schaumann, supra note 245, at 1317 (stating that while many rules have
been adopted, some are still pending).
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become effective and some of the changes have not even yet been
257
The impact and long-term effect of this “record-level”
adopted.
258
new set of regulations is still to be determined.
On November 4, 2003, the Commission adopted a final set of
corporate governance rules regulating all companies that list on
259
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
Among the rules
adopted: regulations that require a majority of a company’s board
to consist of independent directors, tighter restrictions on the
definition of “independent,” and requirements for companies to
adopt and disclose guidelines for corporate governance, business
260
While Sarbanes considered a major set of
conduct, and ethics.
governance rules, the NYSE rules are even more restrictive than
Sarbanes and further enhance the corporate governance practices
261
of American companies.
Furthermore, these rules were just put
262
into place in November 2003.
Like Sarbanes, the impact and
effectiveness of these rules, whether negative or positive, has yet to
be determined.
The Commission has been in this position before. In 1980, the
Commission decided against proposing and implementing a
shareholder access rule despite the urgings of a large shareholder
263
voice.
The Commission instead decided to allow the emerging
concept of nominating committees to be fully implemented before
264
enacting any further regulations regarding director elections.
With ongoing implementation of Sarbanes regulations, the recent
adoption of the New York Stock Exchange rules, and the recent

257. Comments of Broc Romanek, Chair, Corporate & Securities Law
Committee, The American Corporate Counsel Association (June 13, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/ acca061303.htm (last visited April 18,
2004).
258. Id.
259. New York Stock Exchange, Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules
(Nov. 4, 2003) codified as Section 303A in the NYSE Listed Company Manual, at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf (last visited April 18, 2004).
260. Id. § 303A(1) (requiring “listed companies” to have majority of
independent directors on their boards); § 303A(2) (defining “independent
director” as a director who has no material relationship with the listed company);
§ 303A(9) (stating listed companies must adopt and disclose corporate
governance guidelines); § 303A(10) (requiring listed companies to implement
guidelines for business conduct and ethics).
261. Andrew Countryman, U.S. OKs Governance Rules for Listing on Exchanges,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 2003, at 1 (stating the “new rules go beyond [Sarbanes]”).
262. Id.
263. See supra note 29.
264. Id.
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265

nominating committee enhancements,
the Commission finds
itself in a familiar position. The changes in 1980 were not nearly as
266
vast and significant as Sarbanes.
Yet in 1980, the Commission
decided it needed to allow those changes to be implemented and
evaluate their impact before implementing further corporate
267
governance regulations. That is exactly the path the Commission
should now take regarding shareholder nominations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Currently there appears to be a feeling in this country that if
corporate America opposes something, it must be good for
268
shareholders.
However, if a rule imposes a misdirected
regulation on a corporation that limits its “competitiveness,” that is
269
good for no one.
That is especially true if the rule, under the
guise of “corporate democracy,” actually benefits only a few major
shareholders who are under no duty to the corporation. The
270
corporate scandals of 2002
were no doubt harmful for
shareholders, both in terms of trust and personal investment, but
there is vast legislation addressing these scandals. That legislation
needs time to work. Furthermore, regulation of director elections
historically has been left to the individual states. While the
intentions behind corporate democracy are commendable, they are
misguided in the realm of shareholder nominations. “Even though
our intentions are good, . . . the consequences of being wrong
271
could be very serious,” one SEC Commissioner recently said.
Let’s not overreact to the crimes of a few companies by punishing
all companies.

265. See supra note 63.
266. Sarbanes has been called “the broadest and farthest-reaching securities
reform legislation since the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.” Schaumann, supra
note 245, at 1349-50.
267. See supra note 29.
268. Comments of Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, SEC Open Meeting,
supra note 223, at 24:28.
269. Id.
270. Enron, WorldCom, et al. See supra note 220.
271. Comments of Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, SEC Open Meeting,
supra note 223, at 28:20.
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